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Nepal Races to Reopen Prithvi Highway as Bhotekoshi–Trishuli Disaster Toll Mounts

1,384 bodies recovered in Nepal, 4,089 still missing; Krishnabhir emergency track nears completion as scientists trace catastrophe to massive Langtang rock–ice avalanche

DHADING/KATHMANDU, Nepal — More than two weeks after one of the most destructive Himalayan disasters in Nepal’s modern history tore through the Bhotekoshi–Trishuli river corridor, the human toll continues to rise while authorities race to restore a critical highway linking Kathmandu with central and western Nepal.

At Krishnabhir in Dhading district, where the swollen Trishuli River undermined and collapsed a section of the Prithvi Highway, engineers have now connected both ends of a newly carved track higher up the mountainside. The emergency alignment is being prepared for graveling and compaction in an effort to reopen the highway, which has remained blocked at the site for about two weeks.

The Prithvi Highway is one of Kathmandu Valley’s most important supply arteries, carrying passengers, food, fuel, cooking gas and other essential goods between the capital and large parts of central and western Nepal. Its closure has increased pressure on longer alternative routes and contributed to supply disruptions in the capital.

The scale of the wider catastrophe remains extraordinary.

According to Nepal Police’s latest official update, issued at 5 a.m. on Saturday, September 12, 1,384 bodies have been recovered from flood-affected areas in Nepal, while 4,089 people remain listed as missing and search operations continue. The bodies recovered include 185 in Rasuwa, 199 in Nuwakot, 70 in Dhading, 364 in Chitwan, 77 in Gorkha, 38 in Tanahun, 229 in Nawalparasi East and 222 in Nawalparasi West.

Nepal Police said 1,213 recovered bodies had undergone the required procedures for temporary safe management. Authorities have collected 3,065 DNA samples—1,286 from victims and 1,779 from relatives—as investigators confront the enormous challenge of identifying human remains recovered from mud, debris, riverbanks and downstream locations. Police have also published details relating to 1,335 unidentified bodies or remains on their website and deployed 7,975 police personnel for search, rescue, relief distribution and body management.

The disaster was not confined to Nepal. On the Chinese side of the border in Tibet, Reuters reported on September 6 that authorities had confirmed 43 deaths and 519 people missing around the devastated Gyirong border area. Taken together with Nepal’s latest official figure, the known death toll on the two sides of the border has therefore risen to at least 1,427, although casualty and missing-person databases in the two countries are maintained separately and continue to change as identification and verification proceed.

The catastrophe began at approximately 8:37 a.m. Nepal time on August 26, when an enormous mass of rock and glacial ice broke away high on the northern flank of the Langtang Lirung massif.

The event initially generated confusion because seismic instruments detected a signal resembling an earthquake. The U.S. Geological Survey initially reported an earthquake but subsequently reclassified the event after examining long-period seismic waves and satellite imagery. The USGS now says the signal was produced by a glacial collapse, landslide and debris flow with energy equivalent to a magnitude-5.2 earthquake—not by tectonic fault rupture.

Research released by scientists affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences has provided a more detailed reconstruction. Their findings indicate that the disaster began as a massive ice-rock avalanche on Langtang Lirung, with material detaching at roughly 5,200 metres elevation. The avalanche accelerated down the steep mountain terrain, entraining rock, sediment, ice and water and transforming into a huge debris flow. Researchers concluded that the initial catastrophe was not triggered by an episode of heavy rainfall.

The destructive mass travelled roughly 22 kilometres toward Gyirong Port, gathering material and energy as it moved through the narrow Himalayan valleys. Farther downstream, the resulting debris-laden flood propagated through the Lhende Khola–Bhotekoshi–Trishuli river system for roughly 100 kilometres or more. The USGS says the debris flow and flooding travelled approximately 100 kilometres from the source zone.

The speed and scale of the flood stunned residents and emergency officials.

At Galchhi, downstream on the Trishuli River, the water level reportedly surged by about nine metres in only 30 minutes, while Malekhu recorded a rise of roughly seven metres over a similar period, according to data cited by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development.

What followed was a cascading disaster stretching from the high Himalayas through some of Nepal’s most important river valleys.

Rasuwagadhi, Timure, Syafrubesi, Mailung and Betrawati were among the places devastated or isolated as the torrent carried boulders, trees, buildings and infrastructure downstream. Roads vanished, bridges were swept away, hydropower facilities were inundated, transmission infrastructure was damaged and communities were cut off from the national transport system.

The Department of Roads has reported that 41 motorable bridges between Rasuwa and Chitwan were destroyed by the floods. Separate assessments indicate that 35 bridges were completely swept away. In Rasuwa alone, authorities reported approximately 41 kilometres of roads destroyed, along with concrete bridges, Bailey bridges and suspension bridges.

The strategic Betrawati–Rasuwagadhi corridor, which links Nepal with the Chinese border, suffered catastrophic damage. Initial assessments found severe destruction along roughly 42 kilometres of roadway between Betrawati and Rasuwagadhi.

Nepal’s hydropower sector has also suffered one of its worst disaster-related setbacks.

A government-led Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimated that projects representing about 783 megawatts of installed electricity-generation capacity had been affected. Preliminary national damage estimates have reached approximately Rs400 billion, with officials warning that the final figure could rise after completion of the more comprehensive Post-Disaster Needs Assessment.

Several major hydropower projects along the Bhotekoshi and Trishuli corridors were damaged, including Rasuwagadhi, Bhotekoshi, Chilime, Langtang Khola, Upper Trishuli-1, Mailung Khola, Upper Trishuli-3A and Trishuli-3B. Some facilities were buried under mud and debris, triggering complex tunnel rescue operations that continued for days after the flood.

Against that backdrop, restoring the Prithvi Highway has become an urgent national priority.

At Krishnabhir, the flood did something different from the landslides for which the area has historically been notorious. Instead of debris simply falling from the mountain above, the swollen Trishuli attacked the highway from below, eroding its foundation until part of the roadway collapsed toward the river.

Local reports indicate that roughly 100 metres of roadway directly subsided, while the wider affected highway section extends farther along the unstable slope. More recent assessments describe traffic disruption across roughly 300 metres of the corridor.

Because rebuilding the destroyed road on its original alignment would be difficult and unsafe in the short term, engineers began cutting into the mountain above the damaged section.

Sajana Adhikari, chief of the western section of the Nagdhunga–Muglin road project, said workers have completed the connection of a roughly 250-metre new track from both ends of the damaged area. The next phase involves spreading gravel and compacting the road layer by layer before vehicles can be allowed through. Officials hope to restore traffic by the end of the Nepali month of Bhadra if safety conditions permit.

The reopening, however, would provide only an immediate solution.

Engineers and geologists have warned that Krishnabhir remains unstable and that the new mountainside track should not be regarded as a permanent answer. Specialists have recommended slope stabilization and further study of alternatives including tunnels, bridges, soil nailing and other geotechnical interventions.

The government is therefore simultaneously improving an alternative route on the opposite bank of the Trishuli.

Officials are working on a roughly 12-kilometre Benighat–Fisling alternative corridor, connecting surviving bridges and existing local tracks. Infrastructure officials say the government does not want to depend entirely on the temporary Krishnabhir alignment because further slope failure remains possible.

Longer-term concepts under examination include constructing two tunnels of roughly 500 metres each to bypass the dangerous Krishnabhir section or using bridges to take highway traffic across the Trishuli and later return it to the existing alignment.

Krishnabhir has a long history of instability. A major landslide there in 2000 blocked the Prithvi Highway for 11 days. Authorities subsequently used concrete structures, vegetation and bioengineering techniques to stabilize the slope, and those measures remained effective for years. This time, however, engineers faced a fundamentally different threat: unprecedented river erosion undermining the road from its foundation.

The closure has demonstrated how vulnerable Kathmandu remains when one of its principal transport corridors fails.

Vehicles connecting Kathmandu with Dhading, Chitwan, Tanahun, Pokhara and western Nepal have been forced onto alternative routes, including roads through Hetauda. The diversion has added hours to journeys, increased congestion and complicated the movement of essential goods. Reports from Kathmandu have also pointed to pressure on supplies of cooking gas and other commodities as freight traffic struggles to reach the Valley.

Beyond the immediate reconstruction challenge, the August 26 disaster is forcing Nepal to confront a much larger question: whether infrastructure and disaster planning designed primarily for monsoon floods, landslides and glacial-lake outburst floods are adequate for a new class of extremely rapid, cascading high-mountain hazards.

A scientific editorial published in npj Natural Hazards on September 12 argues that the Langtang–Gyirong–Rasuwagadhi catastrophe illustrates the need for warning systems that operate across borders, connecting mountain monitoring, rapid event detection, impact forecasting and pre-authorized emergency action.

Scientists and disaster specialists are increasingly calling for closer Nepal–China cooperation on satellite monitoring, glacier and rock-slope surveillance, seismic detection, river gauges, automated alerts and real-time sharing of upstream hazard information.

The lesson is particularly important because disasters of this type can develop on a completely different timescale from conventional river flooding. A massive rock–ice collapse can transform into a high-speed debris flow within minutes, leaving downstream communities very little time to evacuate.

Researchers are also examining the role of long-term Himalayan warming and glacier degradation in destabilizing steep mountain slopes. While scientists continue to investigate precisely why the Langtang Lirung mass failed on August 26, the event has reinforced concerns about the growing vulnerability of glacierized Himalayan terrain.

For Nepal, reopening Krishnabhir will therefore represent only one small step in a recovery that will take years.

Restoring the Prithvi Highway may soon relieve immediate pressure on Kathmandu’s supply chain. Rebuilding dozens of bridges, reconnecting Rasuwa, repairing hydropower plants, identifying victims and locating thousands of missing people will be far more difficult.

With 1,384 bodies already recovered in Nepal, at least 43 additional deaths reported across the border in Tibet, and thousands of people still unaccounted for, the Bhotekoshi–Trishuli catastrophe has become more than a story of one destroyed road or one extraordinary flood.

It is a warning that Nepal’s future infrastructure must be designed for Himalayan hazards that may be larger, faster and more complex than those on which past engineering assumptions were based—and that, in a mountain system where water, ice, rock and disaster cross national boundaries without warning, early-warning systems and scientific cooperation must cross those boundaries just as quickly.